Economists ignore the concept of hedonic adaptation (the possibility that people automatically bounce back from utility shocks). So also do judges.
Does Happiness Adapt? A Longitudinal Study of Disability with
Implications for Economists and Judges
Introduction
Many articles in psychology journals argue that happiness bounces back after a bad life shock. Yet almost the entire literature of economics ignores this possibility and assumes, either explicitly or implicitly, that there is a simple and stable utility function u(x). When deciding on damages, the courts typically do as well.
Although it is not clear why there is such a divide between economists and psychologists, there are two probable reasons. First, the quality of the evidence is viewed by economists as poor. One of the most famous papers, for instance, is Brickman et al (1978) . This paper is highly cited but not always quoted accurately. It is sometimes claimed in the literature that the authors demonstrate that lottery winners are no happier than non-winners and paraplegics are as happy as able-bodied individuals. In fact, the paper, which uses tiny cross-sections, does not say either of these things. Brickman et al (1978) report data in which disabled people do have lower life-satisfaction scores than the able-bodied, and this difference, when compared to a control group, is statistically significant at conventional levels. Moreover, lottery winners do have higher life-satisfaction scores than the controls, although the null hypothesis of no difference cannot be rejected at the 5% level. Second, one part of the psychology literature proposes the so-called 'set point hypothesis', which is the idea that people adapt completely to life shocks.
Rightly or wrongly, economists view this position --that utility effectively cannot be altered by outside events --as so implausible that it is not worth considering. These attitudes have kept economists and psychologists apart.
In this paper we study how happiness levels adapt (sometimes described as 'habituation'). Frederick and Loewenstein (1999) call this hedonic adaptation.
Another term is affective adaptation, which is the process, to quote Gilbert and Wilson's (2005) definition, whereby affective responses weaken after one or more exposures to a stimulus. A valuable discussion, with examples, is given in Clark et al (2003) . Earlier evidence is discussed in Argyle (1989) and Diener et al (1999) . Easterlin (2003 Easterlin ( , 2005 argues that adaptation is generally incomplete, namely, that people do not merely automatically bounce back to a baseline level of happiness. Clark and Oswald (1994) discuss partial adaptation by the long-term unemployed. Becker and Rayo (2004) and Wilson and Gilbert (2005) are conceptual papers. The first, by two economists, likens hedonic adaptation to the ability of the human eye to adjust quickly, and for sound reasons of self-preservation, to changes in the amount of light. Becker and Rayo set out a mathematical model of how Nature might optimally have designed human beings' emotional responses to behave in a similar way. The second paper, by two psychologists, is different. It views humans as learning to change what they attend to and how they react.
Wilson and Gilbert suggest that hedonic adaptation is not reducible to the type of adaptation found in the sensory or motor systems. The authors argue that adaptation stems instead from the internal human need, and ability, to explain and make sense of stimuli. They advocate what they describe as an AREA model: attend; react; explain; adapt. In a more purely empirical spirit, interesting new work by Riis et al (2005) also examines adaptation. Using an ecological momentary assessment measure of mood, the authors find little evidence that hemodialysis patients are less happy than healthy people. The authors suggest that patients in the sample have largely adapted to their condition; they show also that, in a forecasting task, healthy people fail to anticipate this adaptation. Affective forecasting is indeed known to be imperfect (Gilbert et al 1998 (Gilbert et al , 2002 Ubel et al 2005) .
Other investigators, such as Clark (1999) , Clark et al (2004) , Stutzer (2004) Layard (2005) and Di Tella, Haisken and MacCulloch (2005) , have begun to consider the economic implications of how people adapt. Kahneman and Sugden (2005) discuss the policy implications of allowing for adaptation in experienced utility. Oswald (2001, 2003 ) study adaptation of national happiness to movements in real income. By estimating dynamic equations, they find evidence that the wellbeing consequences of shocks to gross domestic product eventually wear off. Their 2003 paper seems to be one of the first in the wellbeing research literature to suggest a practical way to use difference equations to solve out for a steady-state level of habituation. In principle, the adaptation literature is also related to work on habit formation, such as Carroll et al (2000) and Carroll and Weil (1994) , and potentially to work on broader conceptions of preferences such as Frey and Meier (2004) ; but these links have not, to our knowledge, been explored.
Currently, the economics literature on adaptation is small, and the extent of any hedonic adaptation in the world is not completely understood.
As well as being of theoretical interest, adaptation has practical implications.
Consider a judge who, in a world where people adapt, is trying to decide on the necessary level of compensation to award someone who has negligently suffered a bad life event, L. Initially, the judge must estimate the immediate drop in happiness caused by L upon the person's life. Next, the judge must make an adjustment for the way the person's utility may automatically rebound. To our knowledge, legal scholars have written little on this issue, and judges apparently use mechanical rules of thumb with conceptual foundations that are, at best, ad hoc (see pp 345-347 of Elliott and Quinn, 2005) . However, in a somewhat related spirit to our work, Posner (2000) argues persuasively for a better understanding of the emotions. Posner and Sunstein (2005) touch on similar issues.
Conceptual Issues
For clarity of exposition, let an individual's utility or happiness be given by a simple separable function
where v(.) is increasing and concave in the person's income, y, and h is some measure of overall health. After a disabling shock at time T, which makes work impossible, wellbeing drops to
where D is to be thought of as being in disutility units and z is some external (possibly government benefit) financial support. Assume y strictly greater than z. Because of the assumption of adaptation, define a habituation function D = D(t -T), where t is the current time period, T was the original date of disability, and the first derivative of the function D(.) is negative.
Consider the simplest approach. If a judge's aim is, ex post, to redress the individual's fortunes and restore their original utility level, the optimal compensation is a monetary payment c* that provides equality of utility levels in the two states.
At the general level, there therefore exists an implicit function tying together income, compensation, external support, time, and time of the disability shock:
Solving J = 0 more explicitly under the simple assumptions given above, movements in c* are governed locally by the equation
and the key signs of the partial derivatives of the optimal payment function with respect to time since disability, income, and outside support, are then respectively
The intuition behind these three is straightforward. As time t lengthens since the onset of disability, the compensation level c* falls. This is because psychological adaptation gradually reduces the unhappiness caused by the disability. The higher the person's pre-disability income, the greater is c*.
This says simply that high-wage workers should be compensated more generously for disability. A larger amount of external support z leads to a reduction in c* by an exactly offsetting amount. This is because court settlements can be less generous where other funds become open to disabled individuals. A reasonable question to ask is why insurance is not included in the analytical framework. We deliberately leave this to one side.
Except in a world with full insurance markets, it does not alter the underlying principle that judges will need to prescribe time-varying compensation schedules.
Although the functional forms chosen here are deliberately elementary, the broad principles go through with non-separable wellbeing equations, and with more complex forms of income pre-and post-disability. Time-varying payments will be the typical, not special, outcome in a world with hedonic adaptation.
Implementing an Empirical Test
However, do people really bounce back from a bad life event? Ideally, a longitudinal test is required. To be really persuasive, it needs to have a number of features:
the individuals in the sample must be followed over a reasonably long period, so that information on them is available before a bad life event and afterwards;
(ii) the bad life event must be exogenous;
(iii) there needs to be a comparison group of individuals who do not suffer the event;
(iv) the sample should be at least moderately representative of the adult population;
(v) a set of controls, particularly income, has to be available in the data set, so that confounding influences can be differenced out.
To our knowledge, no study of this type has been published. Our paper is an attempt to come as close as possible to this design.
An interesting example of a bad life event is that of disability. These life satisfaction levels run from 1 to 7. A natural way to think about people's answers is as being true 'utility levels' measured with some reporting error. Watson and Clark (1991) discuss and defend the use of such data.
Oswald (1997) and Frey and Stutzer (2002a, b) summarize the ways in which reported wellbeing numbers' validity has been checked. Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) show that, where data on both are available, happiness equations and life-satisfaction equations have almost identical structures.
In these data, disabled people are less happy than the able-bodied. On a 1 to 7 scale, the mean life-satisfaction score of Not Disabled individuals in our data set is 5.28. It has a standard deviation of 1.27. The 315 people who are disabled but able to do day-to-day activities are less happy than average.
Their mean life-satisfaction score is 4.69, with a standard deviation of 1.67.
The 2204 severely disabled individuals, who cannot do those activities, are worse off still. Their mean wellbeing score is 4.05, with a standard deviation of 1.78. The Appendix gives more details on the data.
As would be expected, there are some people (129 to be exact) who report disability in every year of the panel. These observations are not the most helpful scientifically, because they provide no information about transitions into disability. Nevertheless, they contribute a cross-sectional dimension to the measurement of happiness and disability. The gap in reported life satisfaction scores between these 'always disabled' individuals and the 'always able-bodied' can be calculated. It is depicted --in a raw sense without control variables --in Figure This can be thought of as fairly large, because it is a little less than one standard deviation of mean wellbeing. Although Figure 1 should not be thought of as an accurate estimate --it does not factor out other differences in people's lives --this is a first attempt at a quantitative illustration of the happiness cost of disability.
In this data set, it is possible to follow people longitudinally in the years before and after they become disabled. There are some hundreds of observations on entry into disability. In principle, information on these 'switchers' is particularly valuable. . This is not a fatal difficulty for the study, and is probably inescapable in real-world data sets, but it is a reminder that disability is sometimes preceded by a slow worsening of health or functioning.
Controlling for Other Influences
Although intriguing and stark, the patterns in Figures 2 to 5 do not control for other factors and, as explained below the graphs, often have quite large standard errors attached to them. A longer set of controls is introduced in the life satisfaction equations of Table   2 . In column I, it can be seen that, when compared to the numbers in Table 1, the estimates of disability's effect upon wellbeing are reduced only very fractionally by the allowance for extra regressors. The coefficients on the two kinds of disability are now, respectively, -0.464 and -1.144.
Monetary Compensation and Disability: The Need for a Time Path
In These figures, however, make no allowance for emotional habituation or, put more simply, the idea that the intensity of feelings may wear off. How can such adaptation be studied in a regression framework? The paper does this in the following way. It defines in Table 2 a variable for the amount of time people have previously spent disabled. That fraction of time is then included in wellbeing equations to see if, in the current period, ceteris paribus, past experience softens the psychological blow of current disability.
The paper creates a variable "Past disability from t-3 to t-1" and an equivalent one "Past disability from t-6 to t-1". Each is constructed to take values between zero and unity. A person who has been disabled for one previous year in the last three years, for example, will have the value 1/3 for his or her past disability from t-3 to t-1. More fully: In columns III and IV of Table 2 , interaction terms are now included in the equations. These are statistically well-determined. They allow crude measures of adaptation rates to be inferred from the regression equations.
For example, consider column III of Table 2 = -0.319. In short, the longer the experience of disability, the less emotionally painful current disability appears to be. Loosely, the life satisfaction points lost are 0.6 in the first year of this form of disability, 0.5 in the second, 0.4 in the third, and 0.3 in the fourth. This is a particularly simple attempt to estimate dynamics from Table 2 , of course, and a later part of the paper examines an alternative using fixed-effect estimates.
When the most severe kind of disability is examined (that is, Seriously Disabled, which is the 'unable to do day-to-day activities' category of disability), the effects on wellbeing persist more strongly. The unhappiness from such disability does not wear off quickly. Using the earlier methodology, it can be checked from column III of These broad patterns are robust across sub-samples. Table 3 shows that the same equation structure holds, with well-defined coefficients, for men and women, the young and the old, and graduates and non-graduates.
To this point in the estimation, income has been assumed to enter linearly in the equations. Table 4 demonstrates that concave effects can be found -in quadratic form and in logarithmic form. These imply, because the marginal utility of income is then declining, that much larger monetary amounts would be required to compensate for disability. Depending on specification, disability compensation might here have to approach enormous annual sums --up to ten times as high as the earlier figures based on linear specifications.
Oswald (2005) points out that, when it moves from the study of first derivatives to the study of second derivatives, happiness research has to make much more stringent assumptions about human beings' implicit reporting-function from actual to reported happiness. Future analytical work will have to return to this issue. It is not impossible, at some point in the future, that large amounts of money will turn on expert witnesses' ability to convince judges of the need for a non-linear income term in a subjective wellbeing regression equation.
These regressions are cross-sectional. To go further and difference out people's unobservable dispositions, a fixed effects estimator is required.
Tables 5 and 6 do this. They present within-groups equations. Table 5 has no controls and can be thought of as measuring the reduced-form consequences of 'switching' into disability. Interestingly, the life satisfaction penalty associated with the milder form of disability is now statistically insignificantly different from zero. It has a coefficient of -0.024 with a standard error of 0.075. Severe disability, by contrast, continues to have a welldetermined negative effect upon people's lives, though it is smaller than in previous tables. The coefficient is -0.449 with a standard error of 0.041.
Again, it would be straightforward to work out the income-equivalent value of the wellbeing fall. Another, and a more technical, retort to the paper's ideas is that selection bias might be leading here to the mere appearance of adaptation. In our crosssection equations, for example, it could be argued that the most severely disabled will go on disproportionately to die or to go into hospital, and that this will produce, by a sheer composition effect, a rising mean level of wellbeing among those who remain in the sample. This criticism is potentially important.
Nevertheless, such an argument cannot easily explain either the recovery pattern in Figures 2 to 5, where it is literally the same individuals who are followed each year, or the results in the paper's fixed-effects equations.
A further objection is that wellbeing data might be thought to be philosophically an inappropriate basis for compensation calculations.
Physical incapacity and an inability to make an income, might go this traditional argument, should be the only issue for the courts; pecuniary disadvantage alone ought to be counterbalanced by legal compensation.
That view, however, does not seem persuasive. Judges already have somehow to put a figure on the costs of pain and suffering. Emotional damage may be as important to human beings as physical damage or loss of earnings. In that case, happiness equations, where reported wellbeing is treated as proxy wellbeing with an error term, potentially offer an analytical tool for the courts.
Another potential objection is that income is not truly exogenous and that the wellbeing gain from money may itself wear off. Short of having randomly assigned income, as in lottery windfalls, there is probably little that can be definitively done about the endogeneity of incomes in standard data sets.
However, if instruments could be found, it might be possible to adjust the estimated income parameters in a conventional way. If there is habituationto-income, as DiTella, Haisken and MacCulloch (2005) argue, then that can be incorporated both into the general method set out here and into actual financial compensation settlements. This point may be an important one and our hunch is that it will stimulate future work in the area. Nevertheless, when the life satisfaction equations in tables like Table 2 are re-estimated with lagged levels of income as extra regressors, which we have done as a check on the calculations, a positive steady-state effect of income (of approximately the same size as in Table 2 ) is found. Moreover, when Table 6 is reestimated with a set of lagged income levels, only the current level of income enters with a statistically significant coefficient. In this data set, in other words, we do not seem to find strong evidence of habituation to income.
Another criticism is that the calculations set out earlier are too approximate to be applicable in actual court cases. That objection is a fair one, but it misses the point of the paper. Our purpose here is not to write a handbook for attornies to carry in their back-pockets. It is to describe a way of thinking about adaptation and a broad method for calculating the time path of payments that would be required to compensate individuals for bad lifeevents. Details --and there will be many, including the issue of how to adjust for life events like divorce that have an endogenous component --must be left for the future.
It should perhaps also be noted out that the courts could --even in the futuristic world set out here --continue to award lump-sums for emotional damage. They would not have in a literal sense to award people a time path of payments. The underlying principles of the paper still go through and would instead be used to assess the appropriate discounted value of a single cash payment to a disabled person.
Finally, the results in this paper point to a middle ground between the traditional economist's model of zero adaptation and the extreme set-point model advocated by some authors in the psychology literature. In this sense, it is compatible with emerging papers such as Lucas (2004) and Fujita and Diener (2005) . Our instinct is that the two social-science disciplines will slowly converge in their thinking on these issues.
Conclusions
This paper is a study of the economics of partial hedonic adaptation. It blends new evidence with the simple theoretical idea that, in world where individuals adapt, legal compensation schedules should decline through time.
First, the paper tests for the existence of adaptation in happiness. Using longitudinal data, the paper tracks individuals' levels of reported lifesatisfaction in the years leading up to, and after, disability. We find a striking degree of recovery in human wellbeing. The data do not, however, support the idea that there is a complete return to the old happiness level. Second, 
Life Satisfaction
Note: There were 165 individuals who became seriously disabled at time T and remained seriously disabled in T+1. Serious disability includes those people who are not able to do at least one of the listed day-to-day activities. These include doing the housework, climbing the stairs, getting dressed, and walking for more than 10 minutes. The mean life satisfaction of these individuals at T-2 is 4.52. Note: Life satisfaction is recorded on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 "very dissatisfied" to 7 "very satisfied". Disabled, but able to do day-to-day activities, include those who are disabled but are able to do all of the following: i) housework, ii) climb stairs, iii) dress oneself, and iv) walk for at least 10 minutes. There are 315 observations of people who are disabled but able to do day-to-day activies as opposed to 2,204 observations of seriously disabled individuals who are not able to do at least one of the listed day-to-day activities. Reference variables are: non-disable, female, and no formal education. Round dummies are for the years interviewed in the panel. Standard errors are in parentheses. Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Disabled type Able: disabled, but able to do day-to-day activities include those who are disabled but are able to do all of the followings: i) housework, ii) climb stairs, iii) dress oneself, and iv) walk for at least 10 minutes. Disabled type Unable: disabled, and unable to do day-to-day activities. 
